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E. Gates Garrity-Rokous
Congress included judicial review provisions in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA) of 19461 to serve as "a check against excess of power and
abusive exercise of power in derogation of private right."2 Section 10(c) of the
APA limits the scope of review to "final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy.' 3 However, because the APA does not define what
1. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 500, 551-559, 701-706 (1988)) [hereinafter APA].
2. U.S. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMm. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. NO. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 76 (1941) [hereinafter ATrORNEY
GENERAL REPORT]; see also Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104 (1977) (APA "undoubtedly evinces
Congress' intention and understanding that judicial review should be widely available to challenge the
actions of federal administrative officials"); H.R. REP. No. 1149, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1939), reprinted
in SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC.
No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1946) [hereinafter APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] ("[T]he law must
provide that the governors shall be governed and the regulators shall be regulated, if our present form of
government is to endure.").
3. Section 10(c) reads as follows:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or interme-
diate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the
final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise
final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or deter-
mined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the
agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an
appeal to superior agency authority.
Administrative Procedure Act, § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
Statutes encompassed in the first clause of § 10(c) ("[algency action made reviewable by statute")
are also generally construed to require finality. See Carter/Mondale Presidential Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 711 F.2d 279, 284-85 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (§ 10(c) requires finality of all agency actions unless
statutory language delineates set of directly reviewable actions or otherwise "raise[s] doubts about maintain-
ing the finality requirement").
The APA does not contain an independent grant of subject matter jurisdiction. Califano v. Sanders,
430 U.S. at 107. Rather, litigants must allege a "legal wrong" or an injury "within the meaning of a relevant
statute." § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702. A "relevant statute" under § 10(a) includes the original statutory grant
of authority to the agency (i.e., an agency's "organic" statute) as well as subsequent statutory grants of
power to the particular agency. Section 10(a) also applies to statutes that apply uniformly to some or all
agencies (i.e., a "trans-substantive" statute). See, e.g., Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1988) (requiring
agencies headed by "collegial body" to provide open meetings and advance notice to interested parties);
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988) (setting forth requirements
to assure agency consideration of environmental values). The APA is thus a trans-substantive statute that
supplies procedures for agency action and judicial review thereof when the agency's organic statute does
not contain specific instructions. See JERRY L. MASHAW & RICHARD A. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
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constitutes "final agency action," courts must ascertain when the lack of finality
precludes review.
The question of finality arises when an agency contests an allegation that
its own determination was conclusive. A court must then "establish[] a point
on the time line of the administrative process"'4 early enough to protect the
litigant's rights to a remedy for an injury, yet late enough to respect the
agency's desire to develop policy completely. Courts resolve the finality
question by focusing on whether an agency has made a "definitive" determina-
tion' that has a conclusive effect on a party's rights or obligations.6
Courts review both allegations of injury from individual agency actions and
challenges to agency programs. A "program" is defined as an agency decision
calling for the consistent application of a general policy to individual parties.7
This Note distinguishes two types of programs. "Declared" programs are
publicly announced through rules, using either "on the record" or "notice and
comment" procedures.' "Undeclared" programs, which are the focus of this
Note, operate through announced general directives (e.g., policy statements) or
result from procedures internal to the agency.9 Before the Supreme Court's
decision in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,"0 no court had invoked
section 10(c)'s finality requirement to deny jurisdiction in a challenge to an
agency program."1
In Lujan, the Supreme Court declared that a series of discrete agency
determinations was not "final agency action" within the meaning of section
10(c). 2 The case involved a challenge by the National Wildlife Federation
(NWF) and several of its members to the Department of Interior's "land with-
drawal review program. '13 This undeclared program involved hundreds of
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAWv SYSTEM 50 (2d ed. 1985).
4. Carter/Mondale Presidential Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 711 F.2d at 287.
5. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151 (1967).
6. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
7. See RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1546 (2d ed. 1987) (defining
"program" as "1. a plan of action to accomplish a specific end ... 2. a plan or schedule of activities,
procedures, etc., to be followed"). Commentators assume this definition when discussing review of ongoing
agency decisionmaking. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private
Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1195 (1982) (assuming this definition in discussion of availability of legal
remedies for administrative beneficiaries).
8. "On the record" rulemaking requires agencies to publish proposed rules, hold hearings, and republish
rules over several months or years. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 7-8, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1988).
"Notice and comment" rulemaking merely requires agencies to publish rules and allow time for public
response. § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553.
9. These may include personnel directives, operating standards, training programs, or performance
reviews.
10. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
11. Instead, courts tended to limit jurisdictional reach by invoking standing requirements to determine
the justiciability of complaints seeking programmatic or systemic redress. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1441-51, 1463 (1988) (discussing
evolution of standing and prudential limits on jurisdiction to suits seeking to redress "systemic or probabilis-
tic harms").
12. I10 S. CL at3189-90.
13. Id. at 3182.
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determinations that reclassified over 170 million acres of federal wilderness
land as open to mineral exploration and development. In deciding the case, the
Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction under the APA to review NWF's
challenge to the program because the land withdrawal review program was "not
an identifiable 'final agency action' for purposes of the APA."'
The Court did not deny the existence of an agency program.,5 Rather, it
reasoned that the challenged program did "not refer to a single [agency] order
or regulation, or even to a completed universe of particular [agency] orders and
regulations."' 6 On its reading of the APA, the Court inferred that a program
is only final if it is formally declared by rule or regulation. Consequently, a
litigant injured by an ongoing undeclared program can challenge only the
agency's discrete determinations made pursuant to that program as only de-
clared determinations constitute "final agency actions" under section 10(c). 7
Because the Lujan Court initially determined that the individual plaintiffs alleg-
ing injury from specific reclassification determinations lacked standing, it
concluded that the actions of the Bureau of Land Management were not subject
to judicial review.'t
Lujan's narrow interpretation of "final agency action" significantly weakens
the presumption of judicial review underlying the APA. 19 It is now extraordi-
narily difficult for parties injured by the effects of an undeclared program to
vindicate their rights.2" Those parties are forced to either pursue the costly and
time-consuming process of litigating each individual agency determination
constituting the undeclared program or suffer the injury. Lujan therefore
represents ajurisprudential change2 that: (1) produces results inconsistent with
the policy of administrative accountability underlying the APA;22 (2) presents
a jurisdictional barrier to litigants whose rights are definitively altered by an
undeclared agency program;' and (3) presents "a roadmap [for] agencies
wishing to take actions without risking judicial review."'24
14. Id. at 3189 n.2. The Court also noted that the land withdrawal review program did not constitute
"agency action" under APA § 10(a). Id.; see also infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
15. Id. at 3189 n.2.
16. Id. at 3189-90 & n.2.
17. Id. at 3190-91.
18. Id. at 3188-89. The Court held that respondents failed to establish specific facts sufficient to
demonstrate injury from agency action under an applicable statute. Id. at 3187 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972)).
19. See biifa note 28 and accompanying text.
20. The Tenth Circuit has already relied on Lujan to limit § 10(c) finality to discrete agency determina-
tions and to preclude review of an undeclared program. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1418-21
(10th Cir. 1990) (citing Lujan to deny jurisdiction to public interest plaintiff's claim that Forest Service
determinations not to seek water rights in wilderness areas violated Wilderness Act of 1964).
21. See infra Part I.C.
22. See infra Part I.B. 1.
23. See supra text accompanying note 5.
24. Air Cal. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 654 F.2d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1981) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing holding that letter from FAA administrator applying agency policy to plaintiffs was
not final agency action); see also infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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This Note argues that the vision of final agency action set forth in Lujan
excessively limits judicial review, and therefore requires legislative repair. Part I
discusses judicial review of final agency action prior to Lujan. It describes
Congress' intent to create a general presumption of reviewability in the APA,
the traditional concerns of the finality doctrine, and the constructive finality of
agency programs. Part II analyzes the Lujan decision and its ramifications.
Part III proposes an amendment to section 10(c) of the APA to rectify the
Lujan Court's interpretation of that section.as The proposed amendment grants
courts jurisdiction over a "pattern or practice"26 of agency determinations that
collectively comprise an agency program.27
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF "FINAL AGENCY ACTION"
PRIOR TO LUJAN
A. The APA's Broad Jurisdictional Mandate Over Final Agency Action
The strong common law presumption of judicial review of agency action
is entrenched in the APA. The Senate Judiciary Committee, when recom-
mending the APA to Congress, declared that judicial review was "indispensable
since its mere existence generally precludes the arbitrary exercise of powers
or assumption of powers not granted."'29 The Supreme Court recognized this
presumption by noting that "[t]he legislative material ... manifests a congres-
sional intention that it cover a broad spectrum of administrative actions, and
this Court has echoed that theme by noting that the Administrative Procedure
Act's generous review provisions must be given a hospitable interpretation."3
Section 10(c) establishes a jurisdictional barrier,31 restricting the APA's broad
25. The proposed amendment to § 10(c) would read: "Agency action made reviewable by statute, and
or final agency action, or actions which demonstrate a pattern or practice for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court, are subject to judicial review." (amended as emphasized)
26. The phrase is derived from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707(a),
78 Stat. 261 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1988)).
27. This Note focuses on undeclared programs and does not discuss the finality of declared programs,
which remains unaffected by the Lujan decision.
28. See LOUIs L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 372 (1965) ("The [APA has)
the merit of codifying the presumption of reviewability.").
29. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 31 (1945), reprinted in APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 217.
30. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967) (citations omitted); see also id. at 141
("[Oinly upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts
restrict access to judicial review." (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 380 (1962))).
31. Section 10(c) is a jurisdictional requirement, distinct yet essentially related to the doctrines of
exhaustion and ripeness. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969) (outlining prudential
concerns underlying exhaustion), Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162-64 (1967) (distinguish-
ing § 10(c) finality determination from ripeness). Ripeness and exhaustion, while not at issue in this Note,
are often confused with statutory finality. See, e.g., Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (three separate opinions dismissing action on grounds of exhaustion, § 10(c) finality, and ripeness).
While courts assess ripeness and exhaustion to determine whether a case meets either prudential or Article
III "case or controversy" requirements, finality is a jurisdictional requirement that a litigant must meet to
state a claim under § 10 of the APA. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 193-95; Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759
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review powers to "effective agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in any court. '32 This restriction, however, is a mild one;33 section
10(c) was designed merely to preclude review of preliminary agency deci-
sions.
3 4
The presumption of judicial review persists despite the evolution of meth-
ods of administrative action since Congress passed the APA. 35 Commentators
F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The determination of finality therefore precedes consideration of either
ripeness or exhaustion, and informs both inquiries.
Finality is an essential precondition to ripeness. The ripeness doctrine seeks "to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative
determination has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties" Abbott
Lab., 387 U.S. at 148-49. Ripeness analysis requires courts to determine both the "fitness of the issues"
and the "hardship to the parties." The "fitness of the issues" test assesses whether an issue is purely legal
and whether the agency action is final. Id. at 149. The "hardship to the parties" test assesses the impact
of "withholding court consideration." Id. Courts therefore look to finality to determine ripeness.
The exhaustion requirement "prevent[s] premature interference with agency processes," allows the
agency "an opportunity to correct its own errors," and enables the agency to develop a factual record.
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975). The doctrine states that "no one is entitled to judicial relief
for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." Myers
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). Courts assess finality to determine whether
the administrative decisionmaking has indeed concluded. FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232
(1980) (FTC issuance of complaint not sufficiently final under § 10(c) to constitute exhaustion). The
exhaustion requirement is suspended, however, if appeal to the agency would be "futile." Courts suspend
the requirement that a litigant exhaust her administrative remedies when the agency has decided its position,
or administrative recourse would otherwise be "futile." Futility therefore creates constructive finality when
a court sees little or no chance that the agency will change its position. See infra note 72. When exhaustion
is required by statute, or when agency rules require administrative review of determinations by junior officers
before those determinations are regarded as final, § 10(c) precludes review. Section 10(c) was not intended
to extend exhaustion beyond these limits. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1945), reprinted in
APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 185, 213 ("There is a fundamental inconsistency in requiring
a person to continue 'exhausting' administrative processes after administrative action has become, and while
it remains, effective.").
Thus, the ripeness and exhaustion doctrines both require courts to inquire whether the administrative
activity is sufficiently advanced to warrant judicial review. Courts resolve that question through the finality
determination. See Robert C. Power, Help is Sometimes Close At Hand: The Exhaustion Problem and the
Ripeness Solution, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 611 ("All cases must be ripe, and ripeness depends in large
part on the finality of agency action. The failure to exhaust detracts from finality, thus it detracts from the
fitness of the issues for judicial resolution." (citation omitted)); see also 4 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TiVE LAW TREATISE § 26:10, at 458-59 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing overlap between ripeness, exhaustion,
and finality).
32. S. REP. No. 752,79th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1945), reprinted in APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 185, 213.
33. A restrictive interpretation of § 10(c) finality has implications for the finality requirements of
statutes which were modeled after the APA. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
of 1972 § 4(a), 7 U.S.C. § 136n(a) (1988) (providing judicial review of "final Agency actions"); Social
Security Act of 1935 § 205(g), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988) (providing judicial review of"any final decision
of the Secretary"); Clean Air Act of 1977 § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1988) (providing judicial review
of "final action taken ... by the Administrator").
34. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 2D SFSS., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
27 (Comm. Print 1945) (Section 10(c), "defining reviewable acts, [was] designed also to negative any
intention to make reviewable merely preliminary or procedural orders."), reprinted in APA: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 37.
35. Congress intended to provide generous judicial review to injured parties regardless of the method
of action used:
The term "agency action" brings together previously defined terms in order to simplify the
language of the judicial-review provisions of [sections 701-706,1 and to assure the complete
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note two changes in agency methodology: (1) a shift from the development of
policy through the adjudication of individual cases, to the issuing of rules of
general applicability; and (2) a shift from formal "on the record" rulemaking
to more informal "notice and comment" rulemaking. 36 These changes indicate
a growing preference for less formal methods of agency action.37 What previ-
ously may have been implemented by formal means, i.e., issuance of a rule of
general applicability, may now be implemented through undeclared programs.
Indeed, agencies use undeclared programs to guide case-by-case decisionmaking
and to avoid the promulgation of rules or the public declaration of guidelines.
Because undeclared programs are, by definition, unacknowledged by the
agency, judicial review is the only method by which a private party can seek
to require the agency to identify such a program.38 Consequently, the broad
jurisdictional mandate contemplated by the APA must extend to undeclared
programs.
Lujan contains a classic example of an undeclared program. Over several
years the petitioner, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), reclassified the
protective status of hundreds of individual plots of federal wilderness land.39
The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) alleged that BLM implemented the
individual determinations through a "land withdrawal review program."'
NWF claimed that, under this program, BLM ultimately declassified or with-
drew from protection 180 million acres of wilderness land,4' in violation of
coverage of every form of agency power, proceeding, action, or inaction. In that respect the term
includes the supporting procedures, findings, conclusions, or statements or reasons or basis for
the action or inaction.
H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
2, at 255 (emphasis added).
36. See supra note 8. Many commentators have remarked on the significant changes in agency methods
since the promulgation of the APA in 1946. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act:
A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 268 (1986) (noting courts expanded scope of judicial
review within APA framework during shift from adjudication to rulemaking as preferred method of agency
action); Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP.
CT. REV. 345, 375-82 (noting "massive post-APA change" to informal methods of action, creating "drastic
alteration of the old 'settlement"' of APA); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress,
the Supreme Court. and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 820 (noting
increasing congressional effort to narrow administrative discretion at policymaking stage accompanied
decreasing judicial control over application of agency discretion to specific parties).
37. Courts have condoned the use of the more informal methods of decisionmaking. See, e.g., Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) (upholding constitutional and statutory authority of major rate-
making agency (FPC) to prescribe maximum rates on area-wide, rather than individual-producer, basis);
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (upholding FCC's use of general disqualifying
criteria for denying licenses; exempting decisions made thereunder from "full hearing" requirement);
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding FTC authority to
promulgate rules for determining meaning of statutory standard for illegal trade practices), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 951 (1974).
38. For discussion of cases alleging the existence of undeclared programs, see infra Part I.C.
39. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 277-78 (D.D.C. 1985) (Burford I), aff'd,
835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Burford II), on remand, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988) (Burford IIl), rev'd,
878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Burford IV), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct.
3177 (1990).
40. Burford 1, 676 F. Supp. at 272.
41. Id.
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the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).42 Section 202 of the
Act requires the Secretary of Interior to develop "land use plans" and provides
that "the Secretary may modify or terminate any [land] classification consistent
with such land use plan";43 section 309(3) requires the agency to allow public
participation in all land classification determinations." The district court judge,
as well as the two panels of circuit court judges that heard separate appeals,
assumed without question that these alleged statutory violations resulted from
the existence of a final, reviewable program, even though BLM never officially
declared the program through promulgated rules or regulations.45
B. The Effects-oriented Focus of the Pre-Lujan Finality Inquiry
The APA does not define "finality."46 Instead, courts faced with a ques-
tion of finality under section 10(c) follow the pragmatic approach first outlined
in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, a case which involved a preenforcement
challenge to a Food and Drug Administration regulation on drug labeling.47
The Supreme Court, questioning the ripeness of the challenge for judicial
review, addressed the issue of finality. The Court concluded that because the
regulation had a "direct effect on the day-to-day business" of the petitioning
drug manufacturers, the challenge was sufficiently final for review.4" Follow-
ing Abbott Laboratories, courts consistently held that for an agency determina-
42. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988).
43. Id. § 1712(d).
44. Id. § 1739(e) (1988). BLM did not deny that it had completed "only a fraction" of the plans
required for the declassified land and had not provided for public participation. Burford 1, 676 F. Supp. at
277-78.
45. See Burford 1, 676 F. Supp. at 272; Burford 11, 835 F.2d at 307; Burford II, 699 F. Supp. at 329;
Burford IV, 878 F.2d at 425 n.3.
46. The legislative history makes clear that Congress composed § 10(c) as "a statement of the present
general state of the law." SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 2D SESs., ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE Acr 27 (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 38.
Judicial decisions prior to 1946 required courts to find that an agency action definitively determined a party's
rights or obligations before granting review. See, e.g., Switchmen's Union of N. Am. v. National Mediation
Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (holding National Mediation Board's certification of union as sole representative
of yardmen did not definitively determine rights cognizable under Railway Labor Act and thus was not
reviewable); Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938) (permitting suit in equity against
Interstate Commerce Commission, on grounds that ICC determination was definitively binding on carrier);
see also ATrORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 85 ("Legislation which limits judicial review to
'final' orders merely enacts the self-imposed policy of the courts.").
47. 387 U.S. 136, 149-51 (1967). The Abbott Laboratories Court reviewed precedent from both before
and after the passage of the APA and concluded that "[tlhe cases dealing with judicial review of administra-
tive actions have interpreted the 'finality' element in a pragmatic way." Id. Subsequent decisions have
maintained this judicial preference for a flexible, as opposed to a formalistic, approach to the finality inquiry.
See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980) (citing Abbott Laboratories in holding
that issuance of complaint was not "final agency action" under § 10(c)); Ciba-Geigny Corp. v. EPA, 801
F.2d 430, 435 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Abbott Laboratories requires application of "finality requirement
in a 'flexible' and 'pragmatic' way... [§ 10(c) does not] convey[] some settled, inflexible meaning that
precludes pragmatic or functional considerations." (citations omitted)).
48. 387 U.S. at 152; see also Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 193 (1985) ('IT]he finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has
arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury ....").
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tion to be final under section 10(c), it must be a "definitive" determination of
the rights or obligations of the complaining party.49 Consequently, the finality
inquiry is concerned with the practical effect the agency action has on a party,
not with the agency's label for its actions.
50
C. Pre-Lujan Review of Finality: The Constructive Finality of Agency Pro-
grams
An attack on an agency program alleges that an agency decision directing
the application of policy to individual parties violates either an applicable
statute or the Constitution, thereby causing legal injury to the plaintiff. If the
agency decision is undeclared, a plaintiff must demonstrate the violation
deductively, using as evidence specific applications of the policy to individual
parties. A single application cannot establish the existence of an undeclared
program; rather, a plaintiff can only demonstrate the existence of the program
through evidence of regularity of applications. Courts have consistently assumed
that such a demonstration of an undeclared program is constructively final.
They thus conclude that decisionmaking of a routinized nature demonstrates
that an agency has definitively adopted a program.
Courts have only considered the finality issue in connection with an attack
on an agency program where an agency's organic statute explicitly limits
finality jurisdiction to individual adjudications of parties' rights or obligations.
Haitian Reffugee Center v. Smith,51 for example, involved a class action filed
on behalf of over four thousand Haitians living in America, who claimed that
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) pursued a "program of
accelerated processing" of asylum claims in violation of the Immigration and
49. See Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 242 (relying on Abbott Laboratories' pragmatic analysis of finality
to hold FTC issuance of complaint not final as it had no significant "legal force or practical effect upon
Socal's daily business"); Ukiah Valley Medical Ctr. v. FTC, 911 F.2d 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1991) (FTC
issuance of complaint did not "constitute a definitive determination" of party's rights); see also Port of
Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62,71 (1970) (defining finality
inquiry as "whether the process of administrative decisionmaking has reached a stage where judicial review
will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined
or legal consequences will flow from the agency action." (citation omitted)); cf. Brian C. Murchison, On
Ripeness and "Pragmatism" in Administrative Law, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 159 (1989) (outlining post-Abbott
Laboratories development of "pragmatic" approach in context of finality and ripeness).
50. As Judge Bazelon noted:
Whether or not the statutory requirements of finality are satisfied in any given case depends not
upon the label affixed to its action by the administrative agency but rather upon a realistic
appraisal of the consequences of such action .... Thus, administrative orders are ordinarily
reviewable when "they impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship as a
consummation of the administrative process."
Isbrandtsen v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, J.) (quoting Chicabor & S. Air Lines
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
51. 676 F2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
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Nationality Act (INA)52 and the Fifth Amendment.5 3 The INA presented a
jurisdictional barrier to the challenge: section 106(a) gives exclusive jurisdiction
over "all final orders of deportation" to the courts of appeals. 4 The INS
argued that section 106(a) therefore precluded the district court from asserting
jurisdiction to review a challenge to the program." The Fifth Circuit held,
however, that the program amounted to "a pattern and practice by immigration
officials to violate the constitutional rights of a class of aliens. 516 In so doing,
the court distinguished between an appeal of individual "final orders," review-
able under the INA only in a federal court of appeals, and an allegation of an
undeclared program raising a "separate matter" that is independently cognizable
in the district courts under federal question jurisdiction.
In Jean v. Nelson the Eleventh Circuit applied the Haitian Refugee Center
analysis to the statutory claims of a class of Haitian refugees." The plaintiffs
claimed that the government consistently failed to provide the statutorily
mandated notice of the right to apply for asylum to individuals involved in
exclusion proceedings. The court distinguished between an "individual chal-
lenge on a preliminary procedural matter," barred by section 106(a), and
"allegations of widespread abuses by immigration officials" 59 amounting to
a program or policy, and upheld the district court's exercise of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the distinction between individual
and systemic statutory violations in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc."
Provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 1 provide
52. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1988)).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1988).
55. 676 F.2d at 1032.
56. Id. at 1033. None of the Haitians processed under the program had been granted asylum. Id. at
1032.
57. Id. at 1033. The court noted that § 106(a) limited jurisdiction over an appeal of "all final orders
of deportation" to the courts of appeals. A court of appeals could only review allegations of procedural
irregularities in such a case if it provided a basis for reversing an individual deportation order. Id. However,
the court held that § 106(a) did not preclude a district court from assuming jurisdiction "to wield its
equitable powers when a wholesale, carefully orchestrated, program of constitutional violations is alleged."
Id. The court thus distinguished between allegations of procedural irregularities affecting the legitimacy of
a single asylum determination, and allegations of a widespread, undeclared program of substantive or
procedural irregularities affecting the legitimacy of all asylum determinations. See also Bowen v. Michigan
Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675 (1986) (distinguishing between "method by which
[individual adjudications] are to be determined [and the] determinations themselves" to extend jurisdiction
over former in challenge to Medicare regulation); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 326-32 (1976)
(extending jurisdiction over decision of Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to establish guidelines
governing assessment of continuing disabilities); White v. Mathews, 559 P.2d 852 (2d. Cir. 1977) (holding
Social Security Act provision limiting review to "any final decision" did not preclude review of challenge
to pattern of delays in processing claims of erroneous termination of disability benefits), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 908 (1978).
58. 727 F.2d 957 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
59. Id. at 980 & n.32. On the merits the court held that the INA did not require notice of opportunity
to apply for asylum. Id. at 981-83.
60. 111 S. Ct. 888 (1991).
61. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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amnesty to alien farmworkers by awarding the workers "Special Agricultural
Workers" (SAW) status. 62 Section 302(a) of IRCA limits judicial review to
"an order of exclusion or deportation" and states that "[t]here shall be no
administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an application
for adjustment of status" except in the courts of appeals, as provided in section
106(a) of the INA.63 The Court confronted the question of whether these
sections preclude general federal question jurisdiction over "an action alleging
a pattern or practice of procedural due process violations" by the INS in
administering the SAW program.' The Court noted that Congress narrowly
tailored section 302(a) to limit the courts of appeals' original jurisdiction to
individual "final orders. ' 6 Therefore, the Court held, section 302(a) did not
preclude the district court from exercising its jurisdiction over a challenge to
"procedures and practices" of the INS. 66
Courts have also reviewed allegations of injury resulting from undeclared
programs of agency nonacquiescence, suggesting that constructive finality can
also be inferred in that context. "Nonacquiescence" involves an agency's refusal
to change its internal decisionmaking methods, affecting individual adjudica-
tions, to comply with decisions by courts of appeals.6 Courts have reviewed
allegations of nonacquiescence even when agencies have not declared programs
of decisionmaking contradictory to adverse rulings of courts of appeals.6 In
Schisler v. Heckler,69 for example, the Second Circuit reviewed a claim that
the Social Security Administration (SSA) pursued an undeclared program of
nonacquiescence. The plaintiffs alleged that the SSA consistently failed to
comply with court of appeals judgments that required the SSA to rely on
testimony of an applicant's treating physician when adjudicating disability
benefits. The Second Circuit found that internal SSA guidelines embodied
standards different from those required by prior judicial decisions and held them
62. Id. § 302, 8 U.S.C. § 1160 (1988).
63. McNary, 111 S. Ct. at 893 n.6 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)).
64. Id. at 892.
65. Id. at 897.
66. Id. at 896-97. The Supreme Court did not discuss the Eleventh Circuit's extension of jurisdiction
over statutory claims in its review of Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), or McNary, 111 S. Ct. 888. The
McNary opinion did not mention Lujan, which was decided only eight months previously.
These cases demonstrate that jurisdictional limits on review of individual agency determinations do
not preclude review of allegations that the method or policy guiding each determination violated the organic
statute. These cases also presume the constructive finality of decisionmaking programs, creating a conflict
with the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). See infra
Part II.A.
67. See Heckler v. Lopez 464 U.S. 879,887 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defining nonacquiescence
as express policy of "refusing to implement the binding decisions of the [court of appeals]"). See generally
Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence By Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE
L.J. 679 (1989) (analyzing problem of nonacquiescence); Michael J. Froelich, Note, Administrative
Nonacquiescence in Judicial Decisions, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 147 (1984) (same).
68. See Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
Commentators refer to undeclared decisions not to follow adverse court rulings as "silent" nonacquiescence.
See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 67, at 699 n.94.
69. 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986).
[Vol. 101: 643
1991] Final Agency Action
to be illegal.7" The court did not, however, question the finality of the pattern
of agency activity composing the program of nonacquiescence.7t
The cases discussed in this section suggest that, until Lujan, courts regarded
programs encompassing a series or "pattern" of determinations as constructively
final.72 This presumption is consistent with an effects-oriented approach to
finality jurisdiction; 73 a pattern of agency determinations demonstrates that an
agency has conclusively established its position concerning the rights and
obligations of successive parties. Lujan's approach to statutory finality, howev-
er, adds a significant new jurisdictional hurdle to judicial review of undeclared
programs.
II. LUJAN's SUSPECT CONCEPT OF FINAL AGENCY ACTION
Prior to Lujan, a court's finality inquiry focused on whether the agency's
program had a final effect on the plaintiff-not whether the agency labeled that
decision a "program." 74 In Lujan, however, the Supreme Court limited section
10(c) finality to discrete agency determinations. Statutory finality under the
APA is now intimately linked to the announcement of agency guidelines. It no
longer matters whether an agency's conduct has the effect of a final determina-
tion of a party's rights or obligations. 75 If Lujan is followed, courts will no
longer have jurisdiction under the APA to review undeclared agency programs.
This part of the Note will demonstrate that Lujan's interpretation of section
10(c) (1) severely burdens litigants injured by ongoing, undeclared programs;
(2) contradicts the legislative intent underlying the APA; and (3) provides
agencies with a means to evade judicial review.
70. Id. at 83-85.
71. See also Hyattv. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376,381 (4th Cir. 1986) (series of benefits decisions provided
evidence of "systematic, unpublished policy that denied benefits in disregard of law," thereby constituting
nonacquiescence), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987); cf. Floyd v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 529,532 (5th Cir. 1987)
(differences in language do not constitute nonacquiescence: plaintiffs must offer "evidence of a system-wide
pattern of mistaken adjudication"); Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738 . Supp. 716, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (plaintiff
must provide evidence of pattern of agency decisions that demonstrate "impact upon the adjudicatory
process" to constitute nonacquiescence).
72. A parallel conception exists under the exhaustion doctrine, discussed supra note 31. Courts hold
that if a series of agency determinations demonstrates that further appeal to the agency is futile, the
exhaustion requirement is excused. See, e.g., Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 467, 482-86 (1986)
(exhaustion excused as agency's unrevealed, illegal policy precluded claimants from discovering that it
routinely denied benefits); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 314, 330 (1976) ("unrealistic to expect" agency
to consider challenges to its own procedural regulations in adjudicatory proceedings); Sioux Valley Hosp.
v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 715,724 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The futility exception to the exhaustion requirement applies
when there is nothing to be gained other than an agency decision adverse to the plaintiff." (citation
omitted)); Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 621 F.2d 369,371 (10th Cir. 1980) (further appeal
to agency futile as prior decisions demonstrated agency's established position). See generally JAFFE, supra
note 28, at 446-49 (discussing history of application of futility exception to exhaustion requirement); Power,
supra note 31, at 587 ("Futility seems most pertinent to gauging the pragmatic finality of agency action.");
id. at 578-87 (citing futility cases).
73. See supra Part I.B.
74. See supra Part I.B.
75. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3189-90 (1990).
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A. The Lujan Decision76
In the initial Lujan decision, the district court upheld NWF's claims and
granted a preliminary injunction to prevent mining, reasoning that the program
"removed the only absolute shield against private exploitation of these federal
lands. '77 The court of appeals affirmed on the grounds that "BLM determined
that [land] classifications would be systematically reviewed as part of the
Bureau's Land Withdrawal Review Program ... [and the] Bureau's stated
objective was to cancel a large portion of the [land] classifications created
under the [statute]. '78 On remand for review of NWF's motion for a perma-
nent injunction as well as the government's countermotion for summary judg-
ment, the district court found that the pattern of statutory noncompliance exist-
ed, but held that the higher standard of review accorded to motions for summa-
ry judgment rendered the plaintiff's affidavits insufficient to establish standing
to challenge the program.79 The court of appeals reversed, holding that both
the affidavits and NWF's representational interest established federal jurisdic-
tion.80
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held that, because NWF's
affidavits failed to allege that BLM's activities caused specific and concrete
injury to its members by diminishing their enjoyment of federal wilderness land,
the organization lacked standing.81 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia stated
that, collectively, BLM's declassification determinations failed to constitute "an
'agency action' from the meaning of [section 10(a)], much less 'final agency
action' within the meaning of [section 10(c)]." 8 He reasoned that "[u]nder
the terms of the APA, [the plaintiff] must direct its attack against some particu-
76. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271,272 (D.D.C. 1985) (Burford 1), aff'd, 835
F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Burford If), on remand, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988) (Burford III), rev'd,
878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Burford IV), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct.
3177 (1990); see also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing statutory basis for NWF's
claims).
77. Burford 1, 676 F. Supp. at 278-79.
78. Burford 11, 835 F.2d at 309.
79. Burford 111, 699 F. Supp. at 332.
80. Burford IV, 878 F.2d at 428-33.
81. The Court held that the NWF failed to set forth the "specific facts" necessary to establish standing
under § 10(a) of the APA. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186-87 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740
(1972)). The bulk of the Lujan decision concerns standing and follows precepts Justice Scalia advocated
as a professor. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983). Scalia disputed the prevailing view that the standing doctrine
had a constitutional core whose exact contours vary according to prudential limitations. rather, he argued
that standing fell largely within the control of Congress in that Congress could create individual legal rights
that the judiciary must then enforce. Id. at 885-86. Lujan could represent Justice Scalia's attempt to narrow
the definition of "final agency action" so that it serves as another jurisdictional limit on judicial review.
However, this Note argues that Congress sought to entrench a presumption of judicial review in the APA
that included review of undeclared agency programs.
82. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189; see also id. at 3189-90 n.2 ('[W]e do not contend that no 'land
withdrawal review program' exists .... We merely assert that it is not an identifiable 'final agency action'
for purposes of the APA."). This narrow reading contradicts the expansive definition intended by the drafters
of the APA. See supra note 35.
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lar 'agency action' that causes it harm." 3 Justice Scalia thus literally con-
strued the statutory language to exclude a series of determinations from the
meaning of "agency action," refusing to recognize that the consistency of
BLM's declassification determinations demonstrated the existence of an unde-
clared programmatic decision.81
In a dissent, joined by three other Justices, Justice Blackmun criticized the
majority's characterization of the land withdrawal review program.85 He ar-
gued that the real issue in the case was "whether the actions and omissions that
NWF contends are illegal are themselves part of a plan or policy." 6 The
existence of such a policy, he concluded, was sufficient to satisfy the section
10(c) finality requirement.
8 7
B. The Flaws of the Lujan Approach to Finality
1. Violating the Intent of the APA
Ideally, programmatic decisionmaking allows an agency to implement a
statutory mandate consistently and predictably. However, it is often difficult
or impossible for affected parties to influence the formal, let alone informal,
decisionmaking of large agency bureaucracies through the political process.
8s
Therefore, legislative accountability of administrative agencies requires judicial
oversight of agency programs to unearth systematic deviation from statutory
83. 110 S. CL at3190 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 3189. The Court went on to conclude that because the land withdrawal review program did
not constitute final agency action, the complaint was not ripe for review. Id. at 3190.
Justice Scalia's interpretation ignores the gravamen of the NWF's complaint: BLM made a single
decision to open the lands to mineral exploration without providing for public participation or preparing
land use plans. This decision, although undeclared, certainly lies within the definition of agency action
contained in either § 2(g) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988) (defining "agency action" as "the whole
or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to
act") or in §10(a) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988) (stating in part: "A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."). Congress could demonstrate its desire that § 10(a)
be read broadly by adopting the proposed amendment to § 10(c). See supra note 25.
85. 110 S. CL at 3202 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 3201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 3202 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun correctly perceived the fundamental error
in the majority's conception of § 10(c) finality. His analysis, however, stopped short of considering whether
those "acts or omissions" had a cumulative final effect on the plaintiff. Finality requires not merely the
existence of a policy, but also the application of the policy to individual parties through a program.
88. Congressional oversight of administrative agencies is inherentiy limited. See MARCUs E. ETHRIDGE,
LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION IN IMPLEMENTATION: POLICY THROUGH POLITICS 31 (1985) ("[Llegislative
control [of administrative implementation) became consistently less comprehensive as administrative power
expanded."); Carl McGowan, A Reply to Judicialization, 1986 DUKE L.J. 217, 224-26 (arguing that
"Congress has neither the resources nor the inclination to exercise more than occasional oversight of
administrative proceedings" and that executive oversight is also insufficient and potentially unconstitutional
(citation omitted)); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1695 n.128 (1975) (same); Peter H.A. Lehner, Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 627, 638-42 (1983) (discussing inability of both Congress and Executive adequately to
control agency nonimplementation of statutory commands).
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norms. Informal decisionmaking requires additional judicial oversight because
individual parties may be unaware that the source of their perceived injuries
is, in fact, an agency program. 9
Administrative agencies' evolution toward increasingly informal decision-
making processes is legitimate only if the judiciary maintains the oversight role
contemplated by the APA. 9 The interpretation of section 10(c) outlined in
Lujan, however, will prevent judicial review of a significant form of agency
decisionmaking. This interpretation directly contradicts the purpose of the APA,
whose section 10(c) finality requirement was intended to bar only preliminary
or tentative agency actions.9" The agency decision in Lujan, which led to the
declassification of 180 million acres of wilderness without public participation
or land use plans, was neither tentative nor preliminary.
2. Raising Jurisdictional Barriers to Adversely Affected Parties
Because programs are implemented through a series of discretionary deter-
minations, they are difficult for a plaintiff to challenge if he or she must prove
that an agency abused its discretion in each instance.92 Moreover, a focus on
an individual determination can ignore systemic irregularities; what may appear
to be within the boundaries of agency discretion in a single factual instance
may prove to violate statutory requirements when applied consistently.93 Lujan,
therefore, creates a significant jurisdictional barrier to plaintiffs who allege
injury from an undeclared program.94 By limiting the definition of "final
agency action" to each discrete declassification determination,95 the Lujan
89. This is particularly true when individual parties are isolated and lack access to any advocacy group.
90. See JAFFE, supra note 28, at 320.
91. See supra Part I.B.
92. It is difficult for a litigant to challenge agency discretion exercised through a single determination
solely on the ground that that determination was inconsistent with prior determinations. This is because
general principles of judicial deference limit review of factual determinations by agencies. See, e.g., Historic
Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 856-57 (E.D. Va. 1980) (deciding on merits that
Department of Interior acted within discretion when designating land as historic district, although determina-
tion was inconsistent with prior determinations in locale); Charles H. Koch, Judicial Review ofAdministra-
tive Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469 (1986) (discussing exercise of discretion through individual
adjudications and consequent difficulties of judicial review). Courts have, however, held that the cumulative
effect of a series of discretionary determinations can establish an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Environmen-
tal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 & n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (extending jurisdiction
over claim that refusal to suspend federal registration of pesticides would have cumulative negative effect
on organization's members and environment).
93. The litigation leading up to the Lujan decision is one example. A court might uphold a single land
reclassification determination that violated statutory requirements of public participation and the development
of land use plans on the ground that the determination was a discretionary response to a particular exigency.
The scope of the harm to the environment only emerges, however, through a larger analysis of the whole
program reclassification determinations. A challenge based on such an injury would allege that BLM's
consistent failure to follow statutory requirements constituted an abuse of discretion. See supra notes 39-43
and accompanying text (discussing NWF's statutory claims).
94. These injuries are caused by the undeclared decision mandating individual determinations, which
either violates statutorily proscribed procedures or produces substantive results contrary to the organic statute.
95. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3185 (1990).
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Court signaled that, unless the agency has declared a program by publishing
a rule of general applicability, a litigant can only challenge an agency's particu-
lar determinations.
3. Creating a Roadmap for Agency Evasion
Agencies desiring to implement unpopular programs or programs arguably
in conflict with their organic statutes now have a means of concealing their
actions. Lujan permits agencies seeking to evade judicial scrutiny of their
programs to conceal their implementing guidelines by particularizing their
actions. In fact, agencies have already relied on Lujan to argue that their unde-
clared programmatic activities are unreviewable.96 Thus, agencies now are able
to avoid statutory requirements, because courts no longer have jurisdiction to
review an undeclared program.97
HI. SOLUTION: AN AMENDMENT TO SECTION 10(c) OF THE APA
A. The Concept of a "Pattern or Practice" to Determine the Finality of
Undeclared Agency Programs
1. Prior Statutory Use of "Pattern or Practice" Language
An amendment to section 10(c) defining consistent patterns of agency
activity as "final agency action" would have three important effects: (1) it could
return section 10(c) to its intended scope; (2) it could facilitate judicial over-
sight of undeclared agency programs; and (3) it could provide an incentive for
agencies to declare their programs. A logical source of statutory language for
the amendment to section 10(c) 98 is section 707(a) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.11 Section 707(a) permits the Attorney General of the
96. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1414 (10th Cir. 1990) (relying on Lujan to hold
consistent agency refusals to contest water rights of federal wilderness lands in state court adjudications
was not final agency action); see also Brief for Petitioners at 25, McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 111
S. CL 888 (1991) (No. 89-1332) (INS arguing that Lujan precludes plaintiffs' claim that agency activity
constituted existing program, asserting that Lujan's holding limited "final agency action" to individual immi-
gration application determinations).
97. Curtailing judicial review of undeclared programs also makes it easier for special interest groups
to "capture" the agency decisionmaking process, because the consequences of "capture" are now easier to
conceal. See EDMUND S. PHELPS, POLITICAL ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXT 395 (1985) (noting
desirability of regulation, but concluding citizen oversight is price society pays to ensure agencies are not
controlled by industries they regulate); Stewart, supra note 88, at 1684-87, 1713-15 (discussing causes of
capture, suggesting more effective representation of "public" interests as remedy). See generally RICHARD
J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRAIVE LAW AND PROCESS 19-20 (1985) ("An agency is captured when
it favors the concerns of the industry it regulates ... over the interests of the general public .....
98. See supra note 25.
99. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2003e-6(a) (1988). Applying statutory language
to other areas of law is common legislative practice. For example, the standard of "unfair methods of
competition" was set out in the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988)), was later added to the Sherman Antitrust Act in the District of
1991]
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United States to bring suit to prevent discriminatory employment practices that
are not included in the prohibitions against discrete discriminatory acts outlined
in other sections of Title VII, but instead are evidenced only through consistent
behavior.10 This Note proposes the incorporation of section 707(a)'s "pattern
or practice" language into section 10(c) of the APA to permit federal district
courts to exercise finality jurisdiction over undeclared agency programs that
violate either the APA, other trans-substantive statutes, or the agency's organic
statute.101
It is useful to draw upon the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it establishes
federal court jurisdiction over a pattern or practice of discriminatory employ-
ment decisions that could be characterized as an undeclared discriminatory
employment "program."1 2 Senator Humphrey, floor manager of the Civil
Rights Act in the 88th Congress, explained the phrase as follows: "[A] pattern
or practice would be present only where the denial of rights consists of some-
thing more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of
a generalized nature."10 3 Congress therefore intended the phrase to refer to
a consistent set of actions directed by an undeclared guideline or policy deci-
sion.
2. Application to Administrative Agencies
The'proposed amendment to section 10(c) enables a litigant to demonstrate
the existence of an undeclared program by focusing the inquiry on whether a
consistent pattern or practice of agency determinations definitively established
its rights or obligations.t " The proposed amendment would apply to all agen-
Columbia Act of 1937, ch. 690, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. 693, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988),
repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801, and was applied
to the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337, tit. III, pt. II, 46 Stat. 703 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1988)).
The "pattern or practice" language of Title VII applies to, among other things, federal agencies, and
specifically allows a party alleging a discriminatory employment program to sue the agency directly. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). A federal district court has the power to enjoin any employer, including the federal
government, from engaging in an unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The "pattern or
practice" phrase is therefore applicable to the judicial review of undeclared agency programs.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1988). The 1972 amendments to this subsection transferred the Attorney
General's functions to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Law of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L.
92-261, §5, 86 Stat. 107 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (1972)).
101. Courts engage in similar investigations of patterns of agency activity in determining standards
to measure administrative performance. See MASHAW & MERRILL, supra note 3, at 17.
102. See 110 CONG. REc. 14,239 (1964) (Senator Humphrey explained to Congress that the "pattern
or practice" provision was "meant to exclude action in sporadic instances of violation of rights .... It
would be clear that an establishment or employer that consistently or avowedly denies rights under [Title
VII] is engaged in a 'pattern or practice of resistance."').
103. Id. at 14,270.
104. See supra Part I.B. A plaintiff must allege that prior agency determinations demonstrate a
sufficiently clear pattern or practice of agency decisionmaking to enable a court to infer the existence of
an undeclared decision guiding those individual determinations. The prior determinations would not have
to be final in and of-themselves, but merely a part of an agency's ongoing decisionmaking.
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cy decisionmaking in which the agency consistently determines the rights or
obligations of successive parties. A court reviewing a pattern or practice
allegation would have to judge whether prior agency determinations were
sufficiently similar to the determination affecting the plaintiff to constitute
consistent decisionmaking. 105
To resolve this question a court could look to section 2(g) of the APA. That
section states that" 'agency action' includes the whole orpart of an agency rule,
order, license, sanction, relief or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to
act.' 'I"" Prior determinations would evidence a consistent pattern or practice
if they demonstrated the existence of "the equivalent" of a rule of general
applicability. A plaintiff would allege that this de facto rule "definitively"
determined her rights"°1 and was thus constructively final. A pattern or prac-
tice of determinations therefore demonstrates constructive finality when it
supports the inference of an underlying program governing an agency's determi-
nation in each particular instance.108
Had the proposed amendment been in place at the time Lujan was decided,
the Supreme Court's inquiry would have been very different. The element
sufficient to confer finality jurisdiction would have been the consistency of
BLM's land declassification determinations. The district court would have
An agency could rebut a prima facie showing of a pattern or practice by arguing that the prior
determinations were dissimilar from the determination in the plaintiff's case. Alternatively, the agency could
admit that a final, undeclared program exists, but demonstrate that the program was consistent with the
authorizing statute, thereby reducing the plaintiff's claim to that of an illegal application of a generally
lawful agency program. In either case, the proposed amendment permits litigants to bring a previously
undeclared program to light.
105. Since the APA generally instructs agencies to act as finders of fact, this amendment would require
district courts to determine a pattern or practice as a matter of law. While courts resolve issues of both fact
and law under Title VII, the proposed amendment does not require courts to forgo reliance upon agencies
to develop factual records.
106. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988) (emphasis added).
107. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
108. A court would ask whether the underlying decision provided the practical equivalent of a "rule"
formally declared under § 4 or § 7 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556 (1988). The amount of evidence
necessary to establish the underlying decision would vary according to the nature of the agency's statutory
mandate and the particular decisionmaking method employed.
The feasibility of the proposed amendment is demonstrated by the operation of other statutes that also
permit courts to review agency actions and determine the existence of undeclared programs. For example,
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988) (NEPA), is a trans-
substantive statute (like the APA) that applies to all agencies regardless of their organic statutes. Section
102(2)(C) of NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for
"every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment .... 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). The Council on
Environmental Quality, established under NEPA, has promulgated regulations that define "major Federal
actions" to include the "[aldoption of programs, such as a group of concerted actions to implement a specific
policy or plan[, and] systemic and connected agency decisions allocating agency resources .... 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.18(b)(3) (1990). These regulations are consistent with the requirements for the determination of
program environmental impact statements outlined by the Supreme.Court in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S.
390 (1976). See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 9:01-9:04 (1984); see also James
M. Koshland, Note, The Scope of the Program EIS Requirement: The Need for a Coherent Judicial
Approach, 30 STAN. L. REV. 767, 779-93 (1978) (outlining judicial interpretation of program EIS require-
ment).
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assessed whether the individual determinations were sufficiently similar to
suggest that the agency had a policy of not writing land use plans or providing
for public participation in each discrete declassification. The court would then
have decided whether the case presented a pattern or practice evidencing
governing guidelines or merely a set of tentative policies." 9 If it found the
former, the court would then reach the merits: whether the undeclared program
violated applicable statutes.
B. The Consequences of the Proposed Amendment
Fairness and due process require decisions that distribute benefits or impose
burdens upon individuals to be open and discernible."' 0 The interpretation of
section 10(c) set forth in Lujan presents a jurisdictional barrier to parties
alleging injury from undeclared agency programs and shields these programs
from judicial inquiry. The proposed amendment removes this barrier."' In
addition, by adopting the proposed amendment Congress would signal its intent
to maintain rigorous judicial review of agency programs and would promote
candor on the part of administrative agencies.
1. Reinvigorating the Intent of the APA
The pattern or practice analysis contained in the proposed amendment
returns the focus of section 10(c) finality to the effect of the agency decisions
on the individual litigant.112 A pattern or practice analysis will enable a court
to determine whether successive agency decisions indicate that the agency has
definitively determined the rights or obligations of that litigant. The amendment
will thereby maintain the presumption of judicial review underlying the APA,
enabling the legitimate evolution of methods of administration to continue.113
109. This distinction is narrower than the conclusion reached by Justice Blackmun, who argued that
a policy itself could be final agency action. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
110. See generally Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (upholding
grant of jurisdiction over claim that lack of publicly known housing allocation standards violated plaintiffs'
due process rights).
111. See supra Part II.A.2.
A natural objection to any proposed amendment expanding the jurisdictional provisions of the APA
is that the proposal will add to the caseload of the federal courts. In fact, the Supreme Court's rule in Lujan
presents a greater burden to the courts than does the proposed amendment. Plaintiffs now must challenge
each individual application of an undeclared program, creating far greater potential for judicial overburden-
ing. Further, it is not true that incremental changes in subject matter jurisdiction necessarily lead to a
significant increase in the number of cases filed. For example, the creation of private rights to initiate
regulatory action did not lead to a substantial increase in litigation. See Joseph Dimento, Citizen Environmen-
tal Legislation in the States: An Overview, 53 J. URB. L. 413 (1976) (finding no significant increase in
caseload following expansion of federal environmental citizen suit provisions); Adeeb Fadil, Citizen Suits
against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23 (1985) (same). For a discussion of
the problems of judicial overburdening, see RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
59-166 (1985) (discussing causes and consequences of caseload explosion).
112. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
113. See supra Part I.B.
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2. Promoting Agency Candor
Administrative power is legitimate only when it is exercised openly and
when it is judicially controlled."t 4 If an agency's decisionmaking methods are
open and accessible to the public, parties are able to recognize how their
interests are affected. They therefore can appeal to the executive or legislative
branches to change agency conduct.
The proposed amendment promotes agency candor by enabling injured
parties to challenge undeclared agency programs. Agencies may still decide to
act through undeclared programs, yet the proposed amendment assures that
those programs are also subject to judicial review. While it may be more costly
in the short run for an agency to seek public participation, it will do so, because
it ultimately will be more successful if its decision is challenged in court.
Courts are more likely to refuse to find an agency decision to be an "abuse of
discretion" under section 10(e) of the APA115 if an agency can demonstrate
that it provided "adequate consideration" of the issue, including public notice
and comment." 6 Agencies therefore will be encouraged to declare programs
by following rulemaking procedures.
11 7
114. See JAFFE, supra note 28, at 320 ('The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition,
psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or
legally valid."). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review
ofAgency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 525 (outlining arguments supporting aggressive judicial review of
agency action).
115. 5 U.S.C. 706 (1988).
116. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,46-52 (1983)
(holding agency rescission of passive restraint requirement an abuse of discretion as it failed to provide
adequate consideration of all facts). See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINIs-
TRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 341-73 (1985) (discussing application of "adequate consideration"
standard).
117. Section 4(d) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1988), which outlines requirements for notice and
comment rulemaking, states in part: "Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for
the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule." The proposed amendment thus will result in increased public
participation in programmatic decisionmaking by agencies.
It may be argued that by encouraging agency candor, the proposed amendment does not sufficiently
protect an agency's discretion (if its organic statute so prescribes) to choose between developing policy
through a declared rule or through a series of adjudications. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 294 (1974) (stating that NLRB "is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative
proceeding and that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the
Board's discretion"). However, the proposed amendment will not diminish agency discretion to choose
between rulemaking and adjudication to formulate policy. It will merely encourage agencies to declare their
programs publicly. See David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development
of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 940-42 (1965) (discussing necessity of accessibility in
world of voluminous rules; noting advantages if "a formal announcement of [an] agency's position in a
regulation may permit an individual to obtain judicial review"); Note, Sales of Public Land: A Problem in
Legislative and Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 96 HARV. L. REV. 927, 941 (1983) (discussing
advantages of devices that expose agency policy to "public input and judicial scrutiny").
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IV. CONCLUSION
The proper focus of the section (10(c) finality inquiry should be the effect
of the agency action on the plaintiff and not the label the agency affixes to the
action. In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, however, the Supreme Court
rejected this effects-oriented approach, and rested the finality inquiry upon the
agency's decision to declare (or in this case, not to declare) its actions a
"program." Consequently, the prevailing interpretation of section 10(c) now
prevents federal district courts from exercising statutory jurisdiction over
injuries caused by undeclared agency programs. This interpretation violates the
presumption of reviewability underlying the APA. This allows agencies to
evade judicial review by not declaring programs and by acting through particu-
larized determinations.
An amendment to section 10(c) of the APA offers a solution. A "pattern
or practice" analysis, based on section 707(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,118 returns the focus of finality to the effect of the agency action
on the plaintiff. In short, the amendment enables district courts to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over injuries caused by the effects of undeclared
programs. This result is consistent with the presumption of reviewability
underlying the APA. It further encourages agencies to publicize their programs,
maintaining the legitimacy of the administrative state.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1988).
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